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Abstract: Our paper deals with the security of operational environments for e-
voting and its importance for the security of electronic elections. So far the security 
of e-voting was focused on secure e-voting protocols. We show that the security of 
electronic elections requires a secure operational environment as well. We provide 
a comprehensive catalogue of organizational and technical requirements which 
have to be satisfied by the operational environment in order to operate secure 
remote electronic elections. Our findings provide a basis for the design and 
evaluation of a secure operational environment for e-voting. Security requirements 
for e-voting have been defined in several catalogues. We analyzed the important 
catalogues from the Council of Europe and the German Informatics Society as well 
as two Common Criteria Protection Profiles on e-voting to derive the 
organizational and technical requirements they include for the operational 
environment. We propose a procedure based on IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 in 
order to use our findings for the evaluation of the operational environment thereby 
improving trustworthiness and security of electronic elections. 
1 Introduction 
Electronic voting promises to greatly improve the general experience of voting and 
democratic participation. However the security of electronic elections is of prime 
importance. Our paper deals with the question which organizational and technical 
requirements an institution must satisfy in order to provide a secure operational 
environment to carry out secure electronic elections. Our findings provide a basis for 
design and evaluation of such a secure operational environment to provide secure 
electronic elections. Hence our results are of great value for all institutions which want 
to perform secure electronic elections. 
So far research concentrated on the security of electronic voting systems, in particular 
cryptographic protocols and the corresponding voting software. In [LSB08] we showed 
that such protocols alone cannot achieve the security of electronic elections. The 
operational environment, in which the electronic voting system is operated, has to satisfy 
many technical and organizational requirements as well in order to enable secure 
electronic voting. In our previous work we analyzed state-of-the-art online voting 
protocols for their requirements towards the operational environment. In this paper we 
extend our work by including the most relevant sources for e-voting security 
requirements which we analyzed in depth for their requirements towards the operational 
environment. 
Recently, the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) published two 
Common Criteria Protection Profiles on “Basic set of security requirements for Online 
Voting Products” and “Digital Voting Pen System” intended for the evaluation of 
electronic voting systems ([BSI08]; [BSI07]; [CC]). We scrutinized these Protection 
Profiles to identify the requirements they need the operational environment to satisfy, in 
which the voting systems are deployed. Moreover, we analyzed the “Legal, Operational 
and Technical Standards for E-voting” from the Council of Europe for their requirements 
for the operational environment [Co04]. At last we included the catalogue of 
requirements for online elections in non-governmental organizations of the German 
Informatics Society [GI05] to derive their requirements for the operational environment.  
The result is a very comprehensive catalogue of organizational and technical 
requirements for the operational environment of electronic elections. Examples are 
technical prerequisites like secure hardware, secure communication channels, secured 
rooms for server computers and emergency precautions as well as organizational matters 
like secure registration of voters, monitoring of the voting system and trustworthy 
personnel. 
Finally we propose how our findings could be used as a basis for evaluation and 
certification of the operational environment to verify its suitability to securely operate 
electronic elections thereby improving the security and trustworthiness of electronic 
elections. For the evaluation we recommend a procedure following IT-
Grundschutz/ISO27001 methodology [BSI]. Therefore we studied the IT-Grundschutz-
Catalogues of the BSI [BSI05]. These catalogues provide a comprehensive set of 
requirements, threats and safeguards for securing IT systems and their environment with 
regard to organizational, personnel, infrastructural and technical matters. We analyzed 
the applicability for the evaluation of operational environments for e-voting. We also 
show how the concept of the Voting Service Provider can facilitate the effort of 
providing a secure operational environment thereby making secure electronic elections 
feasible. 
1.1 Related Work 
To our knowledge, the security of operational environments for e-voting and its impact 
on the security of electronic elections has not been considered in depth so far. The most 
relevant catalogues on e-voting security are introduced and analyzed in Section 2. 
1.2 Our contribution 
In [LSB08] we showed that in order to achieve secure electronic elections the 
operational environment must satisfy many organizational and technical requirements. 
The study was limited to requirements which we derived from e-voting protocols. In this 
paper we extend our earlier work. We analyze the most important sources for e-voting 
security to derive the so far most comprehensive catalogue of requirements for the 
operational environment of electronic elections. Our catalogue can be used as a basis for 
the design and evaluation of such operational environments to verify their suitability to 
operate secure electronic elections, thereby improving the security and trustworthiness of 
electronic elections. We show how our catalogue can be integrated in the evaluation 
concept for Voting Service Providers. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the sources for our analysis. 
In Section 3 we present the requirements for the operational environment derived from 
the analysis. In Section 4 we give recommendations how to evaluate a secure operational 
environment based on our findings. Section 5 concludes our paper. 
2 Analyzed sources 
In [LSB08] we showed that the use of secure e-voting protocols is not sufficient to 
implement secure electronic elections. The protocols need many organizational and 
technical requirements to be fulfilled by the operational environment in which the voting 
system is operated.  
Based on ([BSI08]: 1.2.5) we define the operational environment to include the 
hardware, the operating system, additional application software, the network 
infrastructure, the involved personnel (including the election host) and the building and 
rooms where the voting system is located. Because our findings are intended to be a 
basis for evaluation procedures we focus on the server side environment. In online 
voting scenarios the client side environment is under control of the voter and therefore 
cannot be generally evaluated. Here the voter must be assisted on securing his client side 
environment. We consider this issue in the category “Assistance and training”, Section 3. 
In [LSB08] we categorized the requirements we found in the analyzed protocols. But in 
addition to the specific requirements from the protocols there are many more 
requirements given in the e-voting literature. While some of them are directly related to 
the e-voting scenario, others describe general requirements for secure environments in 
which security critical IT systems are deployed. To provide a comprehensive foundation 
for the evaluation of operational environments for e-voting it is necessary to include all 
these requirements. In this paper we therefore analyze the most relevant sources on e-
voting security for their requirements towards the operational environment in electronic 
election scenarios. 
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recently published two 
Common Criteria Protection Profiles on electronic voting ([BSI08]; [BSI07]). In the 
Common Criteria context, Protection Profiles describe assumptions, objectives, 
requirements and threats for a specific family of IT products [CC]. Such a Protection 
Profile can be used by the manufacturer as guidance to construct a secure IT product. 
Moreover, products can be evaluated according to Common Criteria with regard to their 
compliance with the requirements of the Protection Profile. In 2008, the BSI released the 
Common Criteria Protection Profile “Basic set of security requirements for Online 
Voting Products”. This Protection Profile aims to provide security requirements for 
online voting products like for example the software system used for online elections. 
This Protection Profile is intended to be used as a foundation for the evaluation of online 
voting systems in Germany. Although the Protection profile concentrates on the security 
of the software system, it still includes assumptions on the security of the operational 
environment. We integrate these assumptions as requirements in our catalogue. 
In 2007 the BSI published another Protection Profile on the “Digital Voting Pen 
System”. This system is intended for the use in electronic elections based on polling 
stations. Again in addition to the description of security requirements for the digital 
voting pen system, the Protection Profile provides security requirements for the 
operational environment in which the digital voting pen system is deployed. We analyze 
and include these requirements in our catalogue. 
The German Informatics Society (GI) published a catalogue on requirements for Internet 
based elections in associations [GI05]. The GI carries out the election of its 
chairmanship electronically since 2004 [GI]. The GI catalogue considers requirements 
for the voting system development and the execution of the election, requirements for 
the voting servers as well as requirements for the voting software system including 
security and usability aspects. Although requirements for the operational environment 
are not explicitly stated we could derive such requirements as consequence to the 
requirements for the software system. 
In 2004, the Council of Europe published a recommendation on “Legal, Operational and 
Technical standards for E-voting” [Co04]. This recommendation includes many security 
requirements and has been internationally considered and accepted. Again the authors 
did not focus on the issue of a secure operational environment. Still we could derive such 
requirements from the catalogue. 
To sum up, we analyzed the most approved and relevant sources to derive a catalogue of 
security requirements for the operational environment of electronic elections. By 
including the security requirements derived from the electronic voting protocols we 
analyzed in [LSB08], we finally present a comprehensive catalogue of security 
requirements for the operational environment of electronic elections.  
At first our catalogue can be used by election hosts (i.e. the party which wants to carry 
out an electronic election) to see which requirements have to be considered to provide a 
secure operational environment for secure electronic elections. But most important, the 
catalogue provides a basis for evaluation of the operational environment for electronic 
elections and thus can improve trustworthiness and security of electronic voting. 
3 Requirements for secure operational environments 
In the following we will integrate the security requirements we derived from the sources 
mentioned in Section 2 into categories based on the families we defined in [LSB08]. We 
extended the number of families to include all new requirements we found. We also 
include the results of our previous work, namely the requirements for the operational 
environment coming from the protocols. We point out that due to space limitation we 
cannot provide detailed descriptions of the requirements in our catalogue. For the 
protocol related requirements, details can be found in [LSB08]. 
Furthermore, we point out that besides a secure operational environment, secure 
electronic elections of course require a secure voting protocol. As our paper concentrates 
on the security of the operational environment we assume a secure voting protocol in the 
following. 
We will refer to the respective sources using literature references. 
Trusted components 
To achieve the security objectives of e-voting (see [LSB08]), many e-voting protocols 
assume certain components of the voting system to be trustworthy. The protocols cannot 
enforce the secure operation of the components. Thus this must be taken care of by the 
operational environment in which the voting system is implemented. For example, such 
components are a trustworthy administrator who checks the eligibility of voters [Oh99], 
a trustworthy registration authority which is assumed not to collude with an adversary 
[JCJ05] or a trustworthy time stamp server which allows voters to prove that they have 
cast their vote in time before the election terminated [Ba01]. Moreover to guarantee 
security of the electronic election several protocols require that certain components must 
not be able to collude maliciously because otherwise the secure function of the protocol 
is threatened (see also ([GI05]: Y-3)). For example, [Oh99] can achieve secure function 
only as long as the number of colluding participants does not exceed a determined 
threshold. Hence the operational environment must satisfy these requirements for the 
voting system components to ensure the secure function of the protocols. More details on 
these protocol related security requirements for the operational environment can be 
found in [LSB08]. 
Trusted communication 
The operational environment of an electronic voting system must provide secure 
communication channels between the vote-casting device and the election server. The 
communication channels must be protected against modifications and disclosure. The 
operational environment therefore provides the cryptographic operations and protocols 
for the operation of a communication channel which ensures integrity and confidentiality 
of the communication data ([BSI08]: 151,193; [GI05]: G-4). 
The protocols [Oh99], [JCJ05], and [CCM07] use anonymous channels to prevent 
senders from being identified and hence ensure anonymity. Several protocols even 
require an untappable channel to provide perfect secrecy in an information-theoretical 
sense. [JCJ05] uses an untappable channel during registration to prevent simulation and 
forced-abstention attacks. Again we point out that such secure communication channels 
cannot be enforced by the voting protocol itself. They have to be operated by the 
operational environment. 
Trusted storage and erasure 
During an electronic election plenty of highly security critical data have to be stored, for 
example cryptographic keys, blinding factors, ballot data, the electoral roll or monitoring 
and audit records. Partially data has to be stored in the long term, partially it has to be 
erased securely after the election is finished. Long term storage of election data often is 
requested by corresponding legal regulation to allow reproduction of election results. 
Secure erasure of certain data often is required to prevent being used as receipt for the 
vote cast. 
The operational environment must provide storage media which is functioning correctly. 
Integrity and availability of all stored data like vote records in the ballot box, user data 
and voting result must be ensured as long as required. Errors during the storing of votes 
must be reported to the voting system’s security functions. Capacity of storage media 
must be sufficient ([BSI08]: 146,187, [Co04]: III.97,99; [BSI07]: 4.2). Furthermore, the 
operational environment is assumed to store audit records from the server-sided voting 
system in a way that they are protected against unauthorized manipulations, deletion or 
adding ([BSI08]: 148, 189). Ballot data buffered on the voting device outside the control 
of the voting system have to be erased securely after the voting process ([BSI08]: 152, 
194). For online elections, this eventually is the responsibility of the voter. Still the 
voters must be instructed how to erase buffered data. The operational environment must 
provide techniques to secure the integrity of data ([BSI08]: 191), loss of data must be 
prevented ([Co04]: III.77). Sensible data like decryption keys must be protected from 
disclosure. This can be realized by secure storage or secure erasure after the election 
([BSI08]: 150, 192). The archiving techniques and the duration of it must be specified by 
the election host. The election host, i.e. the operational environment, must take care of 
the cleansing (uninstallation and deletion of data) of the server-sided voting system 
([BSI08]: 446; [GI05]: X-9). 
The protocols [Ba01], [JCJ05], [LK02], [Oh99] need the private keys of the voters to be 
stored securely to guarantee privacy. The blinding factors used for blind signatures in 
[Ba01], [LK02] and [Oh99] have to be stored safely because disclosure would threaten 
anonymity of the voters. [JCJ05] and [CCM07] need secure erasure mechanisms to 
delete registration data and the private credential shares. 
Trusted application of cryptography 
The majority of e-voting protocols extensively use public key cryptography to 
implement their security objectives. For example, they use encryption, electronic 
signatures and blind signatures to ensure at least confidentiality, integrity, authenticity as 
well as certificates for registration purposes [LSB08]. Consequently cryptographic 
encryption and signature keys, certificates and public keys need to be generated and 
distributed securely. In a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a Certification Authority 
provides secure generation and distribution of keys and certificates. These actions cannot 
be provided by the e-voting protocol. Thus the operational environment must take care 
of appropriate measures. These could be either providing a PKI or assigning a third party 
to do so. 
The operational environment must provide the cryptographic mechanisms to establish 
secure communication between the vote-casting device and the election server, ensuring 
integrity and confidentiality. Moreover, the operational environment is assumed to 
provide the means for generation, distribution, access and destruction of cryptographic 
keys ([BSI08]: 193; [GI05]: X-6). 
The protocols also require PKI techniques. [Ki01] uses a PKI for key distribution and 
registration of the voters. [CCM07] and [LK02] use certificates for registration purposes. 
[Ba01] uses a public key of the election authority certified by an independent 
Certification Authority. [JCJ05] proposes to generate the tallier’s key pair by a trusted 
third party. 
Trusted time 
Several processes during an electronic election require exact time data. All components 
of the voting system must use the same time to prevent errors. For example, if 
components do not use exact time data, ballots could be rejected on mistake because the 
election server already closed the voting phase but following the client’s time the voting 
phase is still open. This can lead to many problems including legal consequences like for 
example voters complaining about not being able to cast their ballot during voting phase. 
Moreover, exact time is required to match monitoring and audit events with the actual 
voting processes to generate reliable records. The voting protocols cannot provide 
correct time. This has to be done by the operational environment. 
The operational environment of the server makes correct time and time stamps available 
conforming to the actual time. The required exactness is defined by the election host 
([BSI08]: 147,188,419; [Co04]: III.84; [BSI07]: 4.2). 
Trusted organization 
The security of electronic elections, especially online elections, also depends on a secure 
organization of the election. There are many organizational tasks which must be 
performed securely. Of course the organization cannot be provided by the voting 
protocols. The election host and its operational environment are responsible for the 
secure organization. Due to the number of organizational requirements, we restrict to 
some examples. 
The election host must take care of correct election preparation. The electoral board must 
identify the voters correctly ([BSI07]: 4.2). The voting system must be set up correctly. 
Correct operation must be checked ([Co04]: I.31,III.73). The candidate list and time 
tables for all election phases including ending time of the voting phase must be set and 
published. If the election also allows traditional voting in parallel, the election host must 
ensure that voters cannot cast several votes via different voting channels. Registration 
and checking of the electoral roll must be possible for all voters ([BSI08]: 
138,179,417,418,429; [GI05]: X-8; [Co04]: II.37,43). 
The election host and its operational environment must take care of trusted delivery of 
relevant voting materials as well as authentication means (like for example smart cards, 
certificates or passwords) required to cast a vote. Items must be delivered in time and 
only to eligible voters ensuring integrity, authenticity and confidentiality ([BSI08]: 
141,182,427 and [GI05]: X-7). 
After the voting phase the voters shall be prevented from logging on to the voting 
system. Acceptance of votes should be extended shortly to enable voters who logged into 
the system lately to finish casting their vote. The election host specifies the appearance 
of the ballot on the vote-casting device ([BSI08]: 419,441). 
Several protocols themselves require trusted delivery of voting equipment like 
smartcards in [Ki01] and [Ba01] or the randomizers for vote-casting in [LK02]. 
Trusted logging and monitoring 
To facilitate reproduction of the election process and later investigation in case of 
problems, it is recommended to record all relevant processes and events during the 
election. This includes logging of all voting system processes as well as monitoring of 
the hardware, the secured rooms and the personnel. In the similar scenario of 
Certification Authorities in Germany, such measures are even required by legal 
regulation ([SigG01]: §10). 
The voting system shall be auditable. All data and actions related to the election 
processes, attacks, and malfunctions shall be recorded. The election host defines how to 
monitor network and election server and identify malfunctions ([BSI08]: 421,439; 
[GI05]: Y-4; [Co04]: II.57,59,III.103). 
Trusted installation and configuration 
To ensure secure function, the electronic voting system must be installed and configured 
correctly. The integrity of the system must be protected, database consistency must be 
assured. The minimum requirements for all related hardware and software must be 
satisfied. The voting system must not enter any undefined state and must be able to 
recover from interruption. 
Election data (ballot data, electoral register with authentication data, ending time of the 
election) must be transferred to the election server correctly, the ballot box must be 
empty. The server-sided voting system must be configured and initialized correctly 
including authentication data of the electoral board and its personnel ([BSI08]: 138,179; 
[BSI07]: 4.2). 
Availability 
All eligible voters must be able to cast their vote at any time during the voting phase. 
Therefore availability of the voting system must be guaranteed. Connection bandwidth 
and maximum number of simultaneous connections have to be in line with the expected 
size of the election [LSB08]. 
The operational environment must guarantee the robustness, quality of service and 
availability of the network and of the election server. The election host ensures that the 
availability can be recovered in case of malfunctions. Backup systems shall be 
implemented ([BSI08]: 144,185,437,438; [Co04]: I.30,III.71). 
Protection of the voting system 
The integrity of the voting system must be protected to ensure its secure function. This 
includes software and hardware. Especially the safety of the hardware can only be 
protected by the operational environment.  To protect the voting system software, 
standard measures like anti-virus software, intrusion detection systems and firewalls 
must be implemented to prevent attacks from the network or malware [LSB08]. All 
sensible components of the voting system must be protected from unauthorized access. 
In case of emergency the election host must provide appropriate measures to protect the 
security of the election. Here emergencies regarding the voting system as well as the 
environment must be considered. 
The audit system and audit data shall be protected against attacks like unauthorized 
modification. The election host is responsible to protect the election server from network 
attacks. The server must withstand outside influences like power or temperature 
fluctuation or humidity. Only authorized personnel are allowed to enter the server room 
or access the server. Secure operating systems and a security concept for protection of 
the server and the environment must be provided. 
Emergency plans in case of inconsistent storage of votes or malfunctions of network or 
election server are required ([BSI08]: 143,145,184-186,420,439,444; [GI05]: Y-1,Y-2; 
[Co04]: I.32,III.70,109; [BSI07]: 4.2). 
Trusted personnel 
The election host’s personnel are required to be trustworthy. They access the voting 
system only in the expected way, they do not install malware or modify user or system 
data. They do not forward their authentication data to others. They follow the election 
host’s instructions. They observe the voting system and report detected malfunctions 
([BSI08]: 140,181,185; [BSI07]: 4.2). 
Assistance and training 
To ensure correct handling of the voting system by all voters the election host must 
provide assistance on its usage. Moreover the election host must train and instruct all 
personnel involved in the election how to perform their tasks correctly. 
The election host must advise the voter how to use the voting system, how to cast his 
vote unobserved, how to deal with his authentication data and how to secure his vote-
casting device (e.g. in online election scenarios where home computers are used as 
voting-device). The vote-casting device is assumed to be able to properly display the 
ballot, to verify authentic communication with the server, to transfer the ballot to the 
server and to delete the vote afterwards. Here the election host can also assist. The 
personnel are sufficiently trained to understand the secure operation of the voting system 
and to use it appropriately. The election host must instruct them to use the voting system 
only in the intended way, not to install malware, not to modify the voting system or 
election data and not to forward their authentication data. Moreover, they are instructed 
how to observe the network and the election server and how to detect malfunctions 
([BSI08]: 139-142,149,180,181,183,185,190; [GI05]: X-4; [Co04]: II.38,46,III.92,93). 
4 Evaluation of operational environments 
Our catalogue of requirements is intended to be used as a basis for security evaluation of 
operational environments for e-voting. An evaluated and certified operational 
environment improves trustworthiness and security of electronic elections for both voters 
and election hosts. Therefore evaluation is strongly advisable. So far there is no special 
evaluation concept for operational environments for e-voting. The next step is to 
determine an evaluation methodology. Common Criteria focuses on the evaluation of 
software systems. For our purpose, we therefore recommend to use the IT-Grundschutz 
methodology [BSI05]. The IT-Grundschutz-Catalogues provide a comprehensive set of 
modules describing all security relevant aspects of complex IT systems like hardware, 
software, network infrastructure and personnel and relate them to threats and safeguards. 
The IT-Grundschutz-Catalogues are intended for securing and evaluating complex IT 
systems. Moreover, IT-Grundschutz provides an internationally approved evaluation 
methodology based on the IT-Grundschutz-Catalogues/ISO27001 [BSI]. Items which are 
not included, like for example very specific requirements or measures for e-voting, can 
be added as new modules. Such specific e-voting extension is intended to be future 
work. To sum up, IT-Grundschutz is particularly suitable for the evaluation of 
operational environments. 
An analysis shows that the majority of requirements from our catalogue are already 
covered in the IT-Grundschutz-Catalogues. For example, there are modules describing 
threats and safeguards for data protection, cryptographic concepts, archiving, emergency 
planning, personnel, training, and organization in module catalogue B1 [BSI05]. Section 
B2 considers the security of buildings and server rooms, while B3 focuses on server 
systems. Network security like heterogeneous networks and remote access issues can be 
found in B4. Moreover, the IT-Grundschutz-Catalogues provide a comprehensive set of 
safeguards. For example, for archiving they recommend backup systems or appropriate 
storage media, for personnel they provide training plans and for server rooms they 
propose special entry controls. These safeguards can be implemented to provide the 
necessary functionality of the operational environment. 
Some specific requirements of our catalogue are not covered in the IT-Grundschutz-
Catalogues. For example, the very specific requirement of an untappable communication 
channel is not considered. Such new requirements can be added in new extension 
modules for IT-Grundschutz and thereby be included in the evaluation. 
In [LSB08] we introduced the concept of the Voting Service Provider (VSP), a qualified 
trusted third party which technically carries out an electronic election as a service on 
behalf of the election host. In this scenario the VSP provides the secure operational 
environment. Therefore the evaluation would have to be done only once for many 
elections as the VSP can operate many elections for different election hosts. Hence the 
election host does not need to provide and evaluate the operational environment and thus 
safes money and effort. For VSPs we proposed an even more sophisticated approach for 
evaluation. The VSP’s voting software system shall be evaluated according to Common 
Criteria, based on the Protection Profile for online voting systems [BSI08]. In a project 
on remote electronic voting in Germany, a circle of experts in e-voting and technical law 
is developing a legal regulation for remote e-voting and VSPs. This legal framework 
follows the basic ideas of the German Signature Law [SigG01] and the corresponding 
German Signature Ordinance [SigV01], the legal regulation for electronic signatures and 
Certification Authorities in Germany. The new legal regulation includes the demand for 
evaluation of the voting system as well as the operational environment of the VSP 
similar to the security concept given in the Signature Ordinance. Here our catalogue of 
requirements can be used as basis for the evaluation of the operational environment of 
the VSP according to the legal regulation. Since we included the Protection Profile 
[BSI08] in our analyzed sources, its requirements for the voting system as well as for the 
operational environment are regarded in our recommended evaluation concept for VSPs. 
Thus our catalogue is a good choice for evaluating the operational environment of VSPs. 
We conclude that a Common Criteria evaluation of the voting software combined with 
an IT-Grundschutz/ISO27001 evaluation of the operational environment based on the 
requirements from our catalogue, embedded in the legal regulation for e-voting and 
VSPs, is the most comprehensive evaluation approach for electronic elections so far. The 
result will be secure, trustworthy and legally binding electronic elections. 
5 Conclusion 
The result of our paper is a comprehensive catalogue of organizational and technical 
requirements that have to be fulfilled by the operational environment in order to enable 
secure electronic elections. We derived these requirements from a comprehensive 
analysis of relevant literature on security in e-voting. We point out that a further analysis 
might reveal even more detailed requirements. Possible methodologies could be a threat 
analysis based on attack trees [Sc99], or KORA, a method to translate abstract legal 
stipulations into concrete technical design concepts [HPR92]. We consider this as future 
work. Our paper extends our previous work where we derived requirements for the 
operational environment from e-voting protocols [LSB08]. 
Our findings can be used as a basis for evaluation of operational environments to analyze 
their suitability for operating secure electronic elections. We recommend an evaluation 
methodology based on IT-Grundschutz. We point out that secure electronic elections 
require both a secure voting protocol and a secure operational environment in which the 
voting system is operated. Consequently we recommend the evaluation of both parts. We 
show how the concept of the Voting Service Provider can facilitate this approach. The 
combined approach of a secure e-voting protocol embedded in a secure operational 
environment is an important step to enable secure electronic elections. 
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